| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11412 |
| DP11412 The Design and Price of Information | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Alessandro Bonatti; Alex Smolin | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-24 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller. The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his initial private information with supplemental data. The data seller is uncertain about the willingness-to-pay of the data buyer due to this private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu of (Blackwell) experiments as statistical tests to the data buyer. The seller exploits differences in the beliefs of the buyers types to reduce information rents while limiting the surplus that must be sacri ced to provide incentives. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Selling information Experiments Mechanism design Price discrimination Product differentiation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11412 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540226 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Alessandro Bonatti,Alex Smolin. DP11412 The Design and Price of Information. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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