| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11417
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| DP11417 CEO Incentives: Measurement, Determinants, and Impact on Performance |
| Ailsa Roell; Lin Peng
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-26
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We examine, both theoretically and empirically, the determinants and performance impact of three measures of CEO incentives: pay-performance elasticity (PPE), semi-elasticity (PPSE), and sensitivity (PPS). Larger, more R&D intensive, and low-idiosyncratic risk firms have higher PPE and PPSE, resolving puzzling prior empirical findings based on PPS. Performance is generally hump-shaped in PPE and PPSE; shortfalls relative to predicted levels appear particularly detrimental to firm performance, suggesting that the average firm’s incentives are at the low end of the optimal range. Overall, the results obtained with the PPE and PPSE measures accord better with economic intuition than those obtained using PPS. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
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| 关键词 | Executive compensation
Pay-for-performance elasticity
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11417
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540231
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ailsa Roell,Lin Peng. DP11417 CEO Incentives: Measurement, Determinants, and Impact on Performance. 2016.
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