| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11426 |
| DP11426 Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Decio Coviello; Luigi Moretti; Paola Valbonesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-02 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, therefore inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. We find that where courts are inefficient: i) public works are delivered with longer delays; ii) delays increase for more valuable contracts; iii) contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and iv) a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Court efficiency Time incentives Performance in contract execution Enforcement cost Public procurement Delay |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11426 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540240 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Decio Coviello,Luigi Moretti,et al. DP11426 Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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