| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11431 |
| DP11431 The curse of long horizons | |
| Venkataraman Bhaskar; George J. Mailath | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study dynamic moral hazard with symmetric ex ante uncertainty about the difficulty of the job. The principal and agent update their beliefs about the difficulty as they observe output. Effort is private and the principal can only offer spot contracts. The agent has an additional incentive to shirk beyond the disutility of effort when the principal induces effort: shirking results in the principal having incorrect beliefs. We show that the effort inducing contract must provide increasingly high powered incentives as the length of the relationship increases. Thus it is never optimal to always induce effort in very long relationships. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Principal-agency Moral hazard Differences in beliefs High-powered incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11431 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540245 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Venkataraman Bhaskar,George J. Mailath. DP11431 The curse of long horizons. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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