| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11441
|
| DP11441 Choice and Competition in Public Service Provision |
| Tim Besley
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-19
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In spite of a range of policy initiatives in sectors such as education, health care and legal services, whether choice and competition is valuable remains contested territory. This paper studies the impact of choice and competition on different dimensions of quality, examining the role of not-for-profit providers. We explore two main factors which determine whether an alternative provider enters the market: cost efficiency and the preferences of an incumbent not-for-profit provider (paternalism). The framework developed can incorporate standard concerns about
the downside of choice and competition when consumer choice is defective (an internality) or choice imposes costs on those who do not switch (an externality). The paper considers optimal funding levels for incumbents and entrants showing when the “voucher” provided for consumers to move to the incumbent should be more or less generous than the funding for consumers who remain with the incumbent.
Finally, the model also offers an insight into why initiatives are frequently opposed by incumbent providers even if the latter have not-for-profit objectives. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Choice
Competition
Public service
Not-for-profit
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11441
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540255
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Tim Besley. DP11441 Choice and Competition in Public Service Provision. 2016.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
