G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11447
DP11447 Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games
Ulrich Doraszelski
发表日期2016-08-20
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要The timing of decisions is an essential ingredient in modelling any strategic situation. Yet, determining the most realistic and appropriate protocol of moves can be challenging. We introduce a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that they are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. We also show that the equilibria have a remarkably simple structure.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Protocol of moves Dynamic games Markov perfect equilibrium
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11447
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540261
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ulrich Doraszelski. DP11447 Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games. 2016.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Ulrich Doraszelski]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Ulrich Doraszelski]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Ulrich Doraszelski]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。