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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11447 |
DP11447 Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games | |
Ulrich Doraszelski | |
发表日期 | 2016-08-20 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The timing of decisions is an essential ingredient in modelling any strategic situation. Yet, determining the most realistic and appropriate protocol of moves can be challenging. We introduce a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that they are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. We also show that the equilibria have a remarkably simple structure. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Protocol of moves Dynamic games Markov perfect equilibrium |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11447 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540261 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ulrich Doraszelski. DP11447 Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games. 2016. |
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