| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11448 |
| DP11448 Political Foundations of the Lender of Last Resort: A Global Historical Narrative | |
| Luc Laeven; Charles Calomiris; Marc Flandreau | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper offers a historical perspective on the evolution of central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR). Countries differ in the statutory powers of the LOLR, which is the outcome of a political bargain. Collateralized LOLR lending as envisioned by Bagehot (1873) requires five key legal and institutional preconditions, all of which required political agreement. LOLR mechanisms evolved to include more than collateralized lending. LOLRs established prior to World War II, with few exceptions, followed policies that can be broadly characterized as implementing “Bagehot’s Principles”: seeking to preserve systemic financial stability rather than preventing the failure of particular banks, and limiting the amount of risk absorbed by the LOLR as much as possible when providing financial assistance. After World War II, and especially after the 1970s, generous deposit insurance and ad hoc bank bailouts became the norm. The focus of bank safety net policy changed from targeting systemic stability to preventing depositor loss and the failure of banks. Statutory powers of central banks do not change much over time, or correlate with country characteristics, instead reflecting idiosyncratic political histories. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Lender of last resort Central banks Financial crises Bank runs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11448 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540262 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luc Laeven,Charles Calomiris,Marc Flandreau. DP11448 Political Foundations of the Lender of Last Resort: A Global Historical Narrative. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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