| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11457 |
| DP11457 A Model of Biased Intermediation | |
| Alexandre de Cornière; Greg Taylor | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be \textit{congruent} or \textit{conflicting}, and show that this has important implications for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-off than under no bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their efficacy also depends on whether the payoffs exhibit congruence or conflict. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Intermediary Bias Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11457-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540271 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexandre de Cornière,Greg Taylor. DP11457 A Model of Biased Intermediation. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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