G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11457
DP11457 A Model of Biased Intermediation
Alexandre de Cornière; Greg Taylor
发表日期2016-08-23
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be \textit{congruent} or \textit{conflicting}, and show that this has important implications for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-off than under no bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their efficacy also depends on whether the payoffs exhibit congruence or conflict.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Intermediary Bias Regulation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11457-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540271
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alexandre de Cornière,Greg Taylor. DP11457 A Model of Biased Intermediation. 2016.
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