| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11459 |
| DP11459 The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements | |
| Alessandro Lizzeri; Laurent Bouton; Nicola Persico | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt transfers resources across periods; entitlements directly target the future allocation of resources. We prove five main results. First, debt and entitlement are strategic substitutes in the sense that constraining debt increases entitlements (and vice versa). Second, if entitlements are unconstrained, it is sometimes beneficial not to constrain debt (even in the absence of shocks that require smoothing). Third, if debt is unconstrained, it is beneficial to limit entitlements but not to eliminate them. Fourth, debt and entitlements respond in opposite ways to political instability and, in contrast with prior literature, political instability may even reduce debt when entitlements are endogenous. Finally, we identify a possible explanation for the joint growth of debt and entitlements. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Government debt Entitlement programs Fiscal rules Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11459 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Lizzeri,Laurent Bouton,Nicola Persico. DP11459 The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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