G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11459
DP11459 The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements
Alessandro Lizzeri; Laurent Bouton; Nicola Persico
发表日期2016-08-23
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要This paper presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt transfers resources across periods; entitlements directly target the future allocation of resources. We prove five main results. First, debt and entitlement are strategic substitutes in the sense that constraining debt increases entitlements (and vice versa). Second, if entitlements are unconstrained, it is sometimes beneficial not to constrain debt (even in the absence of shocks that require smoothing). Third, if debt is unconstrained, it is beneficial to limit entitlements but not to eliminate them. Fourth, debt and entitlements respond in opposite ways to political instability and, in contrast with prior literature, political instability may even reduce debt when entitlements are endogenous. Finally, we identify a possible explanation for the joint growth of debt and entitlements.
主题Public Economics
关键词Government debt Entitlement programs Fiscal rules Political economy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11459
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540273
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandro Lizzeri,Laurent Bouton,Nicola Persico. DP11459 The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements. 2016.
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