| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11463 |
| DP11463 The Marginal Voter's Curse | |
| Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Helios Herrera | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Turnout Information aggregation Underdog effect Experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11463 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540277 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Helios Herrera. DP11463 The Marginal Voter's Curse. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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