G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11463
DP11463 The Marginal Voter's Curse
Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Helios Herrera
发表日期2016-08-24
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes a rational model of voter participation by generalizing a common-value model of costless voting to include not just pivotal voting but also marginal voting incentives. A new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case, to avoid the marginal voter's curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction. The marginal voter's curse presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter's curse. Moreover, marginal motivations are shown to dominate pivotal motivations in large elections. Model predictions are confirmed in a laboratory experiment and applied in a comparative analysis of electoral rules.
主题Public Economics
关键词Turnout Information aggregation Underdog effect Experiment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11463
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540277
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Helios Herrera. DP11463 The Marginal Voter's Curse. 2016.
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