| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11470 |
| DP11470 Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies | |
| Massimo Massa; Alminas Žaldokas | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-29 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a cross-country study we look at the staggered passage of national leniency laws over 1990-2012. We show that these laws lead to more convictions of cartels, and generally increase the costs of collusion by reducing the average gross margins of the affected firms. We further examine how changing costs of collusion shape firm boundaries and show that firms reorganize their activities by engaging in more horizontal acquisitions, both in the roles as the acquirer and the target. These acquisitions tend to be associated with higher announcement returns. We find little evidence of the increase in strategic alliances or greenfield investments. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Cartels Leniency laws Collusion Firm boundaries M&a |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11470 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540284 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Massa,Alminas Žaldokas. DP11470 Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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