| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11477 |
| DP11477 Non-equilibrium Play in Centipede Games | |
| Nagore Iriberri; Jaromir Kovarik; Bernardo Garcia-Pola | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-29 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in Centipede games. Using many different Centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more explanations are empirically relevant. We find that non-equilibrium behavior is too heterogeneous to be explained by a single model. However, most non-equilibrium choices can be fully explained by level-k thinking and quantal response equilibrium but each model for different subjects. Preference-based models play a negligible role in explaining non-equilibrium play. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11477-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540291 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nagore Iriberri,Jaromir Kovarik,Bernardo Garcia-Pola. DP11477 Non-equilibrium Play in Centipede Games. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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