| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11482 |
| DP11482 Fiscal Federalism, Taxation and Grants | |
| Martin Gonzalez-Eiras | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax centralization and the tax burden determinate even if none of the traditional, expenditure-related motives for centralization considered in the fiscal federalism literature is present. If central and local spending are complements and the trade-off between the cost of taxation and the benefit of spending is perceived differently across levels of government, inter governmental grants become relevant. Calibrated to U.S. data, our model helps to explain the introduction of federal grants at the time of the New Deal, and their increase up to the turn of the twenty-first century. Grants are predicted to increase to approximately 5.5% of GDP by 2060. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal federalism Politico-economic equilibrium Markov equilibrium Public goods Grants |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11482 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540296 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Gonzalez-Eiras. DP11482 Fiscal Federalism, Taxation and Grants. 2016. |
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