G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11484
DP11484 A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets
Doh-Shin Jeon; Jay Pil Choi
发表日期2016-09-01
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Partly motivated by the recent antitrust investigations concerning Google, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. We analyze incentives for a monopolist to tie its monopolized product with another product in a two-sided market. Tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the non-negative price constraint in the tied product market without inviting an aggressive response as the rival firm faces the non-negative price constraint. We identify conditions under which tying in two-sided markets is profitable and explore its welfare implications. Our mechanism can be more widely applied to any markets in which sales to consumers in one market can generate additional revenues that cannot be competed away due to non-negative price constraints.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Tying Leverage of monopoly power Two-sided markets Zero pricing Non-negative pricing constraint
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11484
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540298
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Doh-Shin Jeon,Jay Pil Choi. DP11484 A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets. 2016.
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