| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11492 |
| DP11492 Coalition Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies | |
| Hans Gersbach; Oriol Tejada; Maik Schneider | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-05 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the effects of a novel political institution called Coalition Preclusion Contracts (CPCs) on the functioning of democracies with proportional representation. CPCs enable political parties to credibly exclude one or several parties from the range of coalitions they are prepared to envisage after elections. We consider a simple political game with a two-dimensional policy space in which three parties compete to form the government. We find that CPCs with a one-party exclusion rule defend the interests of the majority by precluding coalition governments that would include so-called extreme parties. This translates into moderation of the policies implemented and yields welfare gains for a large set of parameter values. We discuss the robustness of the results in more general settings and study how party-exclusion rules have to be adjusted when more than three parties compete in an election. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation Political contracts Elections Government formation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11492 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Oriol Tejada,Maik Schneider. DP11492 Coalition Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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