| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11507 |
| DP11507 Wolf Pack Activism | |
| Amil Dasgupta; Alon Brav; Richmond Mathews | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Blockholder monitoring is central to corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare. Mechanisms that enable small blockholders to exert collective influence are therefore important. We present a model in which one or more sizeable lead activists implicitly coordinate with many smaller followers in engaging target management. Our model formalizes a key source of complementarity across the engagement strategies of institutional blockholders, arising from their motivation to attract investment flows, which overcomes free riding even for small blockholders and enables coordinated engagement. We also endogenize ownership changes in anticipation of activism campaigns. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11507-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540321 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amil Dasgupta,Alon Brav,Richmond Mathews. DP11507 Wolf Pack Activism. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
