| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11508 |
| DP11508 Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest | |
| Bo Becker; Ramin Baghai | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a detailed panel data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test to what extent this conflict affects credit ratings. Rating agencies rate issuers that hire them for non-rating services 0.3 notches higher (than agencies that are not hired for such services). Also, within rating categories, default rates are higher for firms that have paid for non-rating services. Both these effects are larger the larger the amount paid for non-rating services is. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for consulting services receive higher ratings despite not having lower credit risk. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit ratings Agency problems Issuer-pays |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11508 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540322 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bo Becker,Ramin Baghai. DP11508 Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest. 2016. |
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