| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11512 |
| DP11512 Patent Pools in Input Markets | |
| Emanuele Tarantino; Markus Reisinger | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that patent pools formed by owners of perfectly complementary patents are anticompetitive if one of the licensors is integrated with a manufacturer. With vertical integration, the pool serves as coordination device, allowing patent holders to restrict supplies to the product market and share the larger profits of the affiliated manufacturer. These results are robust to entry, the contractual and competitive environments. The imposition of an unbundling and pass-through requirement makes patent pools socially desirable. We also show that this requirement is more effective than a mandated non-discriminatory policy enforcing FRAND commitments in screening anticompetitive pools. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Complementary patents Patent pools and joint marketing agreements Vertical integration and restraints Frand Antitrust policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11512 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540326 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emanuele Tarantino,Markus Reisinger. DP11512 Patent Pools in Input Markets. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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