| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11513 |
| DP11513 Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting | |
| Heski Bar-Isaac; Joyee Deb | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Reputation concerns can discipline agents and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are not always observed? Infrequent observation can strengthen reputation incentives and encourage effort. By exerting effort when outcomes are more likely observed, the agent can improve her reputation, and when the audience is inattentive in the future, she can ”coast” on this reputation without additional effort. Such opportunities to coast in the future can in fact lead to greater overall effort than constant observation. We characterize the optimal observability structure to maximize efficient effort. This has implications for the design of review systems or performance feedback systems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Reputation Coasting Observability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11513 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540327 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Heski Bar-Isaac,Joyee Deb. DP11513 Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting. 2016. |
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