全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP11523 Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP11523
	DP11523 Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya
	Michael Kremer; William Jack; Joost de Laat; Tavneet Suri
发表日期	2016-09-21
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	We examine the potential of asset-collateralized loans in low-income country credit markets. When a Kenyan dairy cooperative exogenously replaced high down payments and joint liability requirements with loans collateralized by the asset itself - a large water tank - loan take-up increased from 2.4% to 41.9%. In contrast, substituting joint liability requirements for deposit requirements had no impact on loan take up. There were no repossessions among farmers allowed to collateralize 75% of their loans, and a 0.7% repossession rate among those offered 96% asset collateralization. A Karlan-Zinman test based on waiving borrowing requirements ex post finds evidence of adverse selection with very low deposit requirements, but not of moral hazard. A simple model and rough calibration suggests that adverse selection and regulatory caps on interest rates may deter lenders from making welfare-improving loans with low deposit requirements. We estimate that 2/3 of marginal loans led to increased water storage investment. Real effects of loosening borrowing requirements include increased household water access, reductions in child time spent on water-related tasks, and greater school enrollment forr girls.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	agriculture Credit Borrowing requirements Down-payment Collateralization Asymmetric information Kenya
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp11523-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540337
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Michael Kremer,William Jack,Joost de Laat,et al. DP11523 Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya. 2016.