G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11527
DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
Shlomo Weber; Alexander Shapoval
发表日期2016-09-23
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.
主题Public Economics
关键词Valence Candidates Electoral game Rank objectives Electoral equilibrium Distribution of ideal points
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11527
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540341
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Shlomo Weber,Alexander Shapoval. DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives. 2016.
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