| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11527 |
| DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives | |
| Shlomo Weber; Alexander Shapoval | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Valence Candidates Electoral game Rank objectives Electoral equilibrium Distribution of ideal points |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11527 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540341 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shlomo Weber,Alexander Shapoval. DP11527 Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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