| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11550 |
| DP11550 The Effect of a Merger on Investments | |
| Emanuele Tarantino; Massimo Motta | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-04 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing profitability, will also result in higher investments. To deal with this claim, we first study a general model with simultaneous cost-reducing investments and price choices. Absent scope economies, the merger is anti-competitive: it lowers both total output and investment. With sequential choices, we provide a sufficient condition in a general model for the merger to be anti-competitive. The results are confirmed in a standard Shubik-Levitan parametric model. Only if the merger entails sufficient scope economies, will it be pro-competitive. We also show that a Network Sharing Agreement (by which parties set their investment cooperatively) is preferable to a merger. Finally, we identify a class of models where the same qualitative results extend to quality-enhancing investments. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Horizontal mergers Innovation Investments Network-sharing agreements |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11550 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540364 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emanuele Tarantino,Massimo Motta. DP11550 The Effect of a Merger on Investments. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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