| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11564 |
| DP11564 On the benefits of set-asides | |
| Laurent Lamy; Philippe Jehiel | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Set-asides programs which consist in forbidding access to specific participants are commonly used in procurement auctions. We show that when the set of potential participants is composed of an incumbent (who bids for sure if allowed to) and of entrants who show up endogenously (in such a way that their expected rents are fixed by outside options), then it is always beneficial to exclude the incumbent in the second-price auction. This exclusion principle carries over to other auction formats that favor the incumbent and also to some environments with multiple incumbents. Whether it could be beneficial to exclude some kinds of entrants is also addressed. Various applications are discussed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Set-asides Auctions with endogenous entry Entry deterrence Asymmetric buyers Incumbents Government procurement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11564 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Lamy,Philippe Jehiel. DP11564 On the benefits of set-asides. 2016. |
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