| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11571 |
| DP11571 Influencing Connected Legislators | |
| Marco Battaglini; Eleonora Patacchini | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups' moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators' preferences and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators' Bonacich centralities when the legislators are office motivated or the number of legislators is large. Using data on the 109th-113th Congresses and on congressmen's alumni connections, we estimate the model and find evidence supporting its predictions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Interest groups Economics of networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11571 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540385 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Eleonora Patacchini. DP11571 Influencing Connected Legislators. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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