G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11571
DP11571 Influencing Connected Legislators
Marco Battaglini; Eleonora Patacchini
发表日期2016-10-10
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要This paper studies how interest groups allocate campaign contributions when congressmen are connected by social ties. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the contribution game and characterize the associated allocation of the interest groups' moneys. While the allocations are generally complex functions of the environment (the voting function, the legislators' preferences and the social network topology), they are simple, monotonically increasing functions of the respective legislators' Bonacich centralities when the legislators are office motivated or the number of legislators is large. Using data on the 109th-113th Congresses and on congressmen's alumni connections, we estimate the model and find evidence supporting its predictions.
主题Public Economics
关键词Interest groups Economics of networks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11571
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540385
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marco Battaglini,Eleonora Patacchini. DP11571 Influencing Connected Legislators. 2016.
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