G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11579
DP11579 Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions
Heski Bar-Isaac; John Asker
发表日期2016-10-19
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We consider vertical contracts where the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum advertised price restrictions (MAP) act as a restraint on customers’ information and so can increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints, thereby, soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that they can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers; encouraging service provision; and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM or to the absence of such restrictions.
主题Industrial Organization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11579
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540393
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Heski Bar-Isaac,John Asker. DP11579 Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions. 2016.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Heski Bar-Isaac]的文章
[John Asker]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Heski Bar-Isaac]的文章
[John Asker]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Heski Bar-Isaac]的文章
[John Asker]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。