G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11600
DP11600 Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?
Dirk Schoenmaker
发表日期2016-11-03
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要The stability of a banking system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While large countries can still afford to resolve large global banks on their own, small and medium-sized countries face a policy choice. This paper investigates the impact of resolution on banking structure. The financial trilemma model indicates that smaller countries can either conduct joint supervision and resolution of their global banks (based on single point of entry resolution) or reduce the size of their global banks and move to separate resolution of these banks’ national subsidiaries (based on multiple point of entry resolution). Our empirical results show that the euro-area countries are heading for joint resolution based on burden sharing, while the UK and Switzerland have started a process of downsizing their banks.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Global financial architecture International banks Burden sharing Resolution planning Single point of entry Multiple point of entry
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11600
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540414
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Schoenmaker. DP11600 Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?. 2016.
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