| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11612 |
| DP11612 Under-Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement | |
| Moritz Kuhn; Tom Krebs | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-06 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses a macroeconomic model calibrated to U.S. data to show that limited contract enforcement leads to substantial under-insurance against human capital risk. The model economy is populated by a large number of risk-averse households who can invest in risk-free physical capital and risky human capital. Expected human capital returns are age-dependent and calibrated to match the observed life-cycle profile of median labor income. Households have access to a complete set of credit and insurance contracts, but their ability to use the available financial instruments is limited by the possibility of default (limited contract enforcement). According to the baseline calibration, young households are severely under-insured against human capital (labor income) risk and the welfare losses due to the lack of insurance are substantial. These results are robust to realistic variations in parameter values. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Human capital risk Limited enforcement Insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11612 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540426 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Moritz Kuhn,Tom Krebs. DP11612 Under-Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Moritz Kuhn]的文章 |
| [Tom Krebs]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Moritz Kuhn]的文章 |
| [Tom Krebs]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Moritz Kuhn]的文章 |
| [Tom Krebs]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
