G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11624
DP11624 The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents
Gerard Llobet; Jorge Padilla
发表日期2016-11-11
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要It has been commonly argued that the decision of a large number of inventors to license complementary patents necessary for the development of a product leads to excessively large royalties. This well-known Cournot-complements or royalty-stacking effect would hurt efficiency and downstream competition. In this paper we show that when we consider patent litigation and introduce heterogeneity in the portfolio of different firms these results change substantially due to what we denote the Inverse Cournot effect. We show that the lower the total royalty that a downstream producer pays, the lower the royalty that patent holders restricted by the threat of litigation of downstream producers will charge. This effect generates a moderation force in the royalty that unconstrained large patent holders will charge that may overturn some of the standard predictions in the literature. Interestingly, though, this effect can be less relevant when all patent portfolios are weak making royalty stacking more important.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Intellectual property Standard setting organizations Patent licensing R&d investment Patent pools
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11624
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540438
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gerard Llobet,Jorge Padilla. DP11624 The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents. 2016.
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