G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11625
DP11625 No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior
Beatrice Weder di Mauro; Bernhard Bartels
发表日期2016-11-11
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Do central banks with private shareholders differ in their financial behavior from purely public central banks? Private shareholders might bias central banks toward focusing excessively on profits, dividends and risks to their balance sheets, but their influence may also be mitigated by governance rules. We study 35 OECD central banks, including eight with private shareholders, using new data on governance rules. We find that central banks with private shareholders do not differ from their purely public counterparts in their profitability, nor are they more financially cautious in the sense of building more loss-absorbing capacity. Surprisingly, their transfers to governments out of current profits tend to be higher, not lower. We find that broader governance rules matter for financial payouts.
主题International Macroeconomics and Finance
关键词Central bank governance Private sharehoders
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11625
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540439
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Beatrice Weder di Mauro,Bernhard Bartels. DP11625 No Smoking Gun: Private Shareholders, Governance Rules and Central Bank Financial Behavior. 2016.
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