| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11631 |
| DP11631 Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets | |
| Thomas Mariotti; Andrea Attar; François Salanié | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-12 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase coverage from several insurers. Under adverse selection, multiple contracting severely restricts feasible trades. Indeed, only one budget-balanced allocation is implementable by an entry-proof tariff, and each layer of coverage must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of a game in which cross-subsidies between contracts are prohibited. Equilibrium contracts exhibit quantity discounts and negative correlation between risk and coverage. Public intervention should target insurers' strategic behavior, while consumers can be left free to choose their preferred amount of coverage. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Insurance markets Multiple contracting Adverse selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11631 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Mariotti,Andrea Attar,François Salanié. DP11631 Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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