| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11632 |
| DP11632 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Daniel Müller | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-13 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A non-governmental organization (NGO) can make a non-contractible investment to provide a public good. Only ownership can be specified ex ante, so ex post efficiency requires reaching an agreement with the government. Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party with the larger valuation should be the owner. We show that when transaction costs have to be incurred before the bargaining stage can be reached, ownership by the government can be optimal even when the NGO has a larger valuation. Our finding also contrasts with the standard private-good setup where the investing party (i.e., the NGO) should always be the owner. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Transaction costs Public goods Property rights Bargaining Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11632 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540446 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Daniel Müller. DP11632 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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