G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11632
DP11632 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs
Patrick W. Schmitz; Daniel Müller
发表日期2016-11-13
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要A non-governmental organization (NGO) can make a non-contractible investment to provide a public good. Only ownership can be specified ex ante, so ex post efficiency requires reaching an agreement with the government. Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party with the larger valuation should be the owner. We show that when transaction costs have to be incurred before the bargaining stage can be reached, ownership by the government can be optimal even when the NGO has a larger valuation. Our finding also contrasts with the standard private-good setup where the investing party (i.e., the NGO) should always be the owner.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Transaction costs Public goods Property rights Bargaining Incomplete contracts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11632
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540446
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick W. Schmitz,Daniel Müller. DP11632 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs. 2016.
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