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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11641 |
DP11641 Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics | |
paolo pinotti; Alberto Alesina; Salvatore Piccolo | |
发表日期 | 2016-11-16 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We show that in Sicily Mafia killings of politicians increase before elections and have negative effects on the vote received by parties not captured by the Mafia. Then, using a very large data set of electoral speeches, we find strong evidence that anti-mafia activities by politicians elected in Sicily are, in fact, negatively correlated with the levels of pre-electoral violence. Using data on homicides in all regions of Italy starting from the end of the nineteenth century, we identify a political cycle of homicides only in regions with organized crime. We also show how this electoral cycle changes as a function of different electoral rules and the relative strength of captured and non-captured parties. All these empirical findings are rationalized by a simple signaling model in which criminal organizations exert pre-electoral violence to inform adverse politicians about their military strength. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Organized crime Electoral violence Voting Political discourse |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11641 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540455 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | paolo pinotti,Alberto Alesina,Salvatore Piccolo. DP11641 Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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