G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11646
DP11646 Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy in a Debt Crisis
Morten Ravn
发表日期2016-11-18
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We analyze time-consistent fiscal policy in a sovereign debt model. We consider a production economy that incorporates feedback from policy to output through employment, features inequality though unemployment, and in which the government lacks a commitment technology. The government's optimal policies play off wedges due to the lack of lump-sum taxes and the distortions that taxes and transfers introduce on employment. Lack of commitment matters during a debt crises -- episodes where the price of debt reacts elastically to the issuance of new debt. In normal times, the government sets procyclical taxes, transfers and public goods provision but in crisis times it is optimal to implement austerity policies which minimize the distortions deriving from default premia. Could a third party provide a commitment technology, austerity is no longer optimal.
主题International Macroeconomics and Finance
关键词Time-consistent fiscal policy Sovereign debt Debt crisis Austerity Inequality
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11646
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540460
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Morten Ravn. DP11646 Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy in a Debt Crisis. 2016.
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