| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11646 |
| DP11646 Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy in a Debt Crisis | |
| Morten Ravn | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze time-consistent fiscal policy in a sovereign debt model. We consider a production economy that incorporates feedback from policy to output through employment, features inequality though unemployment, and in which the government lacks a commitment technology. The government's optimal policies play off wedges due to the lack of lump-sum taxes and the distortions that taxes and transfers introduce on employment. Lack of commitment matters during a debt crises -- episodes where the price of debt reacts elastically to the issuance of new debt. In normal times, the government sets procyclical taxes, transfers and public goods provision but in crisis times it is optimal to implement austerity policies which minimize the distortions deriving from default premia. Could a third party provide a commitment technology, austerity is no longer optimal. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Time-consistent fiscal policy Sovereign debt Debt crisis Austerity Inequality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11646 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540460 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Morten Ravn. DP11646 Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy in a Debt Crisis. 2016. |
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