| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11665 |
| DP11665 Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice | |
| Jerome Pouyet; David Bardey; Denis Gromb; David Martimort | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-25 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mis-selling Expertise Retailing Competition Regulation Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11665 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540479 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,David Bardey,Denis Gromb,et al. DP11665 Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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