G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11665
DP11665 Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
Jerome Pouyet; David Bardey; Denis Gromb; David Martimort
发表日期2016-11-25
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Mis-selling Expertise Retailing Competition Regulation Asymmetric information
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11665
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540479
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jerome Pouyet,David Bardey,Denis Gromb,et al. DP11665 Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice. 2016.
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