| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11688 |
| DP11688 Screening for Patent Quality | |
| Mark Schankerman | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening, we develop an integrative framework incorporating four main policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that examination and pre-grant fees are complementary, and that pre-grant fees screen more effectively than post-grant fees. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. patent and litigation data, indicate that patenting is socially excessive and the patent office does not effectively weed out low-quality applications. We use the calibrated model to quantify the welfare effects of various counterfactual policy reforms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation Patents Screening Litigation Courts Patent fees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11688 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540502 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Schankerman. DP11688 Screening for Patent Quality. 2016. |
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