G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11693
DP11693 Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk
Rui Albuquerque; Luis Cabral
发表日期2016-12-07
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We show that, in the presence of correlated investment opportunities across firms, risk sharing between firm shareholders and firm managers leads to compensation contracts that include relative performance evaluation. These contracts bias investment choices towards correlated investment opportunities, thus creating systemic risk. Furthermore, we show that leverage amplifies all such effects. In the context of the banking industry, we analyze recent policy recommendations regarding firm managerial pay and show how shareholders optimally undo the policies' intended effects.
主题Financial Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11693
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540507
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rui Albuquerque,Luis Cabral. DP11693 Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk. 2016.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Rui Albuquerque]的文章
[Luis Cabral]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Rui Albuquerque]的文章
[Luis Cabral]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Rui Albuquerque]的文章
[Luis Cabral]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。