| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11693 |
| DP11693 Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk | |
| Rui Albuquerque; Luis Cabral | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that, in the presence of correlated investment opportunities across firms, risk sharing between firm shareholders and firm managers leads to compensation contracts that include relative performance evaluation. These contracts bias investment choices towards correlated investment opportunities, thus creating systemic risk. Furthermore, we show that leverage amplifies all such effects. In the context of the banking industry, we analyze recent policy recommendations regarding firm managerial pay and show how shareholders optimally undo the policies' intended effects. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11693 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540507 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rui Albuquerque,Luis Cabral. DP11693 Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk. 2016. |
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