| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11731 |
| DP11731 Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions | |
| Xavier Vives; Carolina Manzano | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Demand/supply schedule competition Private information Liquidity auctions Treasury auctions Electricity auctions market integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11731-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540545 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives,Carolina Manzano. DP11731 Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions. 2016. |
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