| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11751 |
| DP11751 Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II | |
| Hans-Joachim Voth; Philipp Ager; Leonardo Bursztyn | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-06 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using newly-collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honored publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections. |
| 主题 | Economic History ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Status competition Nonfinancial incentives Employee motivation Behavioral economics World war ii |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11751-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans-Joachim Voth,Philipp Ager,Leonardo Bursztyn. DP11751 Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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