| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11761 |
| DP11761 E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India | |
| Esther Duflo; Abhijit Banerjee; Clément Imbert; Rohini Pande | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-09 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials’ self-reported median personal assets fell. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | transparency Financial reform Leakage Audits Workfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11761 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540575 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Esther Duflo,Abhijit Banerjee,Clément Imbert,et al. DP11761 E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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