| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11763
|
| DP11763 Network Capital |
| Robert Akerlof; Richard Holden
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-10
|
| 出版年 | 2017
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper explores the problem of assembling capital for projects. It can be difficult to assemble capital, when it is disaggregated, for a project that exhibits increasing returns. Small investors may be reluctant to participate, as they may question the ability of the project owner to raise the additional capital he requires. This suggests the possibility that agents with blocks of capital (capital that is already aggregated) might earn rents. Similarly, agents with "network capital" — that is, an ability to aggregate the capital of others — may earn rents. In this paper, we develop a theory of the rents attached to capital assembly, and discuss the implications for a range of issues from investment, to growth, to inequality. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Network capital
investment
Increasing returns
Inequality
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11763
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540577
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Robert Akerlof,Richard Holden. DP11763 Network Capital. 2017.
|
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