| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11766 |
| DP11766 A Theory of Threshold Contracts | |
| Hans Gersbach | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal–agent relationship and examine the consequences of threshold contracts, which forbid reappointment if the principal’s utility is too low. Typical examples are voter–politician or government–public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of the agent’s effort and decides whether to reappoint the agent or not. We analyse the stationary Markovian equilibria of this game with and without threshold contracts. We identify the circumstances under which such threshold contracts are welfare-improving or beneficial for the principal, which, in turn, may justify attempts to introduce such contracts in politics. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Principal–agent model Repeated game Reappointment Stationary markovian strategies Threshold strategies Threshold contracts Asymmetric information Commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11766 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540580 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach. DP11766 A Theory of Threshold Contracts. 2017. |
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