| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11769 |
| DP11769 Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information | |
| Jerome Pouyet; David Martimort | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetric information, a "virtual Hotelling rule" describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a "virtual Herfindahl principle" and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Non-renewable resource Delegated management Optimal contract Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11769 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540583 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jerome Pouyet,David Martimort. DP11769 Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information. 2017. |
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