| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11777 |
| DP11777 The Logic of Hereditary Rule: Theory and Evidence | |
| Tim Besley; Marta Reynal-Querol | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Growth Hereditary institutions Political agency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11777 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540591 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tim Besley,Marta Reynal-Querol. DP11777 The Logic of Hereditary Rule: Theory and Evidence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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