G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11782
DP11782 First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Dirk Bergemann; Benjamin A Brooks; Stephen Morris
发表日期2017-01-14
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词First-price auction Information structure Bayes correlated equilibrium Private values Interdependent values Common values Revenue Surplus Welfare bounds Reserve price
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11782
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540596
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Bergemann,Benjamin A Brooks,Stephen Morris. DP11782 First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. 2017.
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