| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11782 |
| DP11782 First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Benjamin A Brooks; Stephen Morris | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-14 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | First-price auction Information structure Bayes correlated equilibrium Private values Interdependent values Common values Revenue Surplus Welfare bounds Reserve price |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11782 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540596 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Benjamin A Brooks,Stephen Morris. DP11782 First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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