G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11813
DP11813 The Unexpected Consequences of Asymmetric Competition. An Application to Big Pharma
Georges Siotis; Micael Castanheira; Maria-Angeles de Frutos; Carmine Ornaghi
发表日期2017-01-27
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要This paper shows that a pro-competitive shock leading to a steep price drop in one market segment may benefit substitute products. Consumers move away from the cheaper product and demand for the substitutes increases, possibly leading to a drop in consumer surplus. The channel leading to this outcome is non-price competition: the competitive shock on the first set of products decreases the firms' ability to invest in promotion, which cripples their ability to lure consumers. To assess the empirical relevance of these findings, we study the effects of generic entry into the pharmaceutical industry by exploiting a large product-level dataset for the US covering the period 1994Q1 to 2003Q4. We find strong empirical support for the model's theoretical predictions. Our estimates rationalize a surprising finnding, namely that a molecule that loses patent protection (the originator drug plus its generic competitors) typically experiences a drop in the quantity market share-despite being sold at a fraction of the original price.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Asymmetric competition Pharmaceutical industry Generic entry
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11813
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540626
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Georges Siotis,Micael Castanheira,Maria-Angeles de Frutos,et al. DP11813 The Unexpected Consequences of Asymmetric Competition. An Application to Big Pharma. 2017.
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