| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11849 |
| DP11849 The Design of Credit Information Systems | |
| Venkataraman Bhaskar; Caroline Thomas | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the performance of large credit markets subject to borrower moral hazard, when information on the past behavior of borrowers is subject to bounded memory constraints. Borrowers who default should be temporarily excluded in order to efficiently incentivize repayment. However, lenders have an incentive to lend to borrowers who are near the end of their exclusion period, undermining this punishment. With perfect information on past behavior, no lending can be sustained, independent of the length of memory. Coarse information about borrowers' histories improves outcomes, by mitigating lender moral hazard. By pooling recent defaulters with those who defaulted further in the past, coarse information induces borrower adverse selection. This disciplines lenders, who are now unable to target loans towards those defaulters who are least likely to offend again. Paradoxically, efficiency can be improved by non-monotonic information structures that pool non-defaulters and multiple offenders. Equilibria where defaulters get a loan with positive probability can also improve efficiency, by raising the proportion of likely re-offenders in the pool of recent defaulters. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Credit markets One-sided moral hazard Information design Repeated games with randomly matched players |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11849 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540662 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Venkataraman Bhaskar,Caroline Thomas. DP11849 The Design of Credit Information Systems. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
