| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11853 |
| DP11853 Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs | |
| Cheng-Gang Xu; Di Guo | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random sampling survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at the cost of management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Institution Property rights entrepreneurship Time allocation Chinese economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11853 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540666 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cheng-Gang Xu,Di Guo. DP11853 Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs. 2017. |
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