| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11854 |
| DP11854 China’s Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights | |
| Cheng-Gang Xu | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A distinct feature of China’s privatization is that its design and implementation are decentralized and administered by the local governments. Based on a proprietary survey dataset containing 3,000 firms in over 200 cities, this paper studies how city governments choose among various privatization methods, how these methods transfer control rights, and how they influence privatization outcomes. We find that less political opposition to labor downsizing and greater fiscal capacity prompt cities to choose direct sales to insiders (MBOs) as their privatization method. This method transfers the most control rights to private owners, retains the least government supports and is associated with most hardened budget constraints, restructure most effectively, and achieves the greatest performance improvement. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Privatization Chinese economy Control rights Restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11854 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540667 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cheng-Gang Xu. DP11854 China’s Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights. 2017. |
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