| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11864 |
| DP11864 Political Cycles and Stock Returns | |
| Luboš Pástor; Pietro Veronesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Heterogeneous agents make two choices: whether to work in the public or private sector and which of two political parties to vote for. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats---the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts higher average stock market returns under Democratic presidencies, explaining the well-known ``presidential puzzle." The model can also explain why economic growth has been faster under Democratic presidencies. In the data, Democratic voters are more risk-averse. Public workers vote Democrat while entrepreneurs vote Republican, as the model predicts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political cycles Risk aversion Presidential puzzle |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11864-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luboš Pástor,Pietro Veronesi. DP11864 Political Cycles and Stock Returns. 2017. |
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