| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11867 |
| DP11867 Information Design: A Unified Perspective | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persua- sion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Bayesian persuasion Correlated equilibrium Incomplete information Robust predictions Information structure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11867 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540680 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Stephen Morris. DP11867 Information Design: A Unified Perspective. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dirk Bergemann]的文章 |
| [Stephen Morris]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dirk Bergemann]的文章 |
| [Stephen Morris]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dirk Bergemann]的文章 |
| [Stephen Morris]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
